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THE BEARINGS OF PHILOSOPHY ON EDUCATION.*

IF Political Economy is (or was) the Dismal Science, Education as a theoretical study has perhaps some claim to be called the Dreary Science. It is a subject on which it is so easy to say something and so difficult to say just the right thing, that it has produced a body of literature which is probably on the whole unsurpassed for tediousness. The things said about it are so indefinite that it is almost a relief to find that any of them is even definitely wrong, so impalpable that one rejoices to find something that is at least a palpable absurdity. Yet it is relieved by splendid flashes. It has the glory of counting on its lists one of the greatest books of all time,—the “Republic” of Plato; and in more modern times it has been enriched by the pregnant humor of Rabelais, the grave eloquence of Milton, the good sense of Locke, the fire of Rousseau, the wisdom of Goethe, the playful depth of Jean Paul Richter, the scientific thoroughness of Herbart, and many others of hardly inferior note. If only the gold could be separated out from the dross, it might well be transformed from the Dreary Science into a treasure-house of wisdom. Now there seems some hope in our own time that this transformation may be gradually accomplished. At any rate, there is a growing interest in its study. No doubt, if I were sitting in the seat of the scorner, instead of standing on the platform of an important educational institution, I might suggest reasons for this growing interest which would be more gratifying to the cynic than to the friends of human progress. Why have the Germans become so intent upon it? Perhaps because it gives them another “Fach” and new themes for doctors’ dissertations. What has roused the French? They want a new topic for conversation. Why do even the English show signs of awaking? Because they begin to suspect that, after all, the subject may have some bearing on the purse. As

* An Address to the Teachers’ Guild at Newport, February 7, 1898.

for the Welsh, they were always enthusiasts, and don't count. But perhaps there are deeper reasons for the increasing prominence of educational questions, both in theory and in practice. As the game of politics becomes more serious, as we pass more and more from dynastical questions to constitutional questions, and from constitutional questions to social questions, it becomes perhaps by degrees more apparent to us that, in the words of Seeley, "Culture is the larger half of politics;" that the first necessity of a state is to have good citizens, and that education, in the largest sense of the word, is the art by which good citizens are created.

Now, there are various methods of dealing with the subject of education, and there are many sciences that throw light on it; but an interest that goes so deeply into human life, that concerns the unfolding of the highest faculties and the preparation for the most important ends of mankind, must belong mainly to the province of philosophy. Accordingly, it is not by accident that the most suggestive treatise on education is still—as I suppose it is—that of Plato; and that the best of our recent writings on the subject (the essay by Nettleship in the "Hellenica") is a commentary on Plato. Again, from the more purely psychological side, we have such names as those of Locke and Herbart. It is not, however, my object in this paper to put forward any far-reaching claims on behalf either of psychology or of philosophy as a guide to the student of education. I think one may get light from Goethe as well as from Plato, from Milton as well as from Locke, from Rousseau as well as from Herbart; and, where so much that is said is only darkness visible, I think that light from any quarter should be welcome. The claims that I wish to put forward on behalf of philosophy are comparatively modest; and, indeed, my purpose is not so much that of pressing any claims in particular as that of defining the exact nature of the light that those who are interested in education may hope to derive from psychology and from philosophy, and so attempting to guard against the double danger of extravagant hope and complacent neglect. And, perhaps, it may be most convenient at the very outset to sound a note of warning to those

who may expect more from the study of such subjects than they are ever likely to yield.

It may be thought, no doubt, by some, that, before proceeding to any such note of warning, it would be more becoming to offer some apology for saying anything about such a subject as philosophy at all. I had occasion once to deliver a course of popular lectures on philosophy to an audience composed partly of working-men; and having had the curiosity to ask one of them what he thought of the attempt to popularize such a subject, he answered that certainly his first feeling had been one of sheer astonishment; for his impression, as he said, was that philosophers were a peculiar race of beings who existed upwards of a thousand years ago and lived in tubs. But this was not said in Wales, or even in Monmouthshire; and perhaps I may venture to assume here that the word philosophy is sufficiently known and honored, that you are prepared to regard it as the name of a study which is of the greatest interest and profit, not merely as a historical curiosity, but as the means of discovering some of the most valuable truths; and, consequently, that it is my first business not to stimulate you to pursue it, but to warn you not to expect too much from it.

Now it is, I suppose, our British habit—which we do not easily abandon—to ask first of all, with respect to every subject that comes before us, What is its use? If we are convinced that no answer can be returned in any particular instance, we are apt to set that subject aside with contempt; but if we are persuaded that the subject has some utility, we straightway set ourselves to study, not the subject, but its supposed uses. It was thus that we turned the physical sciences and political economy to minister to our comforts and to our prejudices; and one sometimes fears, that if ever we really interest ourselves in psychology and philosophy, it will only be to further our trade or to defend our superstitions. To guard against such possible misapplications, it is sometimes worth while to protest that in a certain sense such a subject as philosophy, and even such a subject as psychology cannot possibly be of any use at all. And, indeed, it is not only the

narrowness of the British intellect that is sometimes in need of warning on this score. We may find instances enough in Greece and in France, as well as among ourselves, of the dangerous strength of ideas when men, instead of taking them into their systems to be chewed and digested, turn them at once into hands and feet.

Even the "Republic" of Plato is not without its warning on this side. Interpreted (as we no doubt ought to interpret it) as an ideal sketch, bringing out the significance of certain aspects of human life by throwing them into relief, its suggestiveness of great truths is almost beyond praise. But if we take it, as we are too apt to do, as a hard and fast doctrine, a statement of what life ought to be, what the state should be like, how poetry should be reformed, and how education should be conducted, it becomes almost grotesque. Now, though Plato seems to have been to a large extent aware that his "Republic" was of the former character rather than of the latter, yet he does seem to have been partly under the illusion that it was possible, by a purely intellectual construction, to show what the world should be. And some of his followers have been still more manifestly misled, whether what they sought to reform was education or the social state in general. That such a view is illusory can hardly be doubted. Philosophy cannot construct the world for us *in vacuo*, or any part of the world. It can only interpret our experience, and so criticise it. It is one of the great merits of Aristotle that he saw this clearly; and accordingly his educational proposals are put forward in a much more tentative way than those of Plato, and with a much more direct reference to the teaching of experience. Of course, it is not possible here to discuss the value of the educational ideas either of Plato or of Aristotle; but I have thought it well to disclaim at the outset the idea that philosophy can ever directly teach us how we are to educate ourselves, or how we are to do anything else; and something of this sort is, I am afraid, what people are apt to expect philosophy to do for them, when they believe in philosophy at all.

If we limit ourselves to psychology, as distinguished from

speculative philosophy,—*i.e.*, if we limit ourselves to the discussion of the processes and the development of the human mind,—the case is no doubt somewhat different. Here we are dealing with a limited province of experience, and our study of its nature may help us to introduce valuable modifications into the methods of education. But even here I cannot but believe that those who expect any sudden illumination from the introduction of the new lights of psychology are doomed to a good deal of disappointment. Reforms in education have generally come from practical experience and sympathetic insight, rather than from theorizing; and I believe that it is likely to continue so in the future. Psychology cannot tell us what are the ends at which it is most desirable to aim; and even with regard to the means it can enlighten us only in a quite general way. The details have still to be discovered by practical experience and by that miscellaneous body of knowledge and insight which we commonly call good sense.

I have thought it well to preface what I am about to say with these somewhat discouraging remarks, because, when one speaks of applying philosophy to education or to any other thing, I am afraid people are apt to think that we mean to apply it as we might apply a poultice or a pill,—what Carlyle used to call a Morrison's Pill. Hegel tells us that there was a book once published in English called "The Art of Preserving the Hair, on Philosophical Principles, neatly printed in post 8vo, price seven shillings." I have also seen in a catalogue of old books the following title, "J. Rudolph Glauber's Description of New Philosophical Furnaces, or a New Art of Distilling; . . . set forth in English by J. F., *with wood-cuts*, thick small 4to, sheep, neatly rebounded, *the Errata a little imperfect*, 15s." Now an art of training the mind on philosophical principles would be almost as absurd as an art of distilling or of preserving the hair; and a philosophical school is almost as little to be thought of as a philosophical furnace. And if we are to understand the true nature of the light that philosophy may reasonably be expected to cast on educational aims and methods, we must clear our minds from the very start of any such misconceptions.

What is it, then, that philosophy can do for us? In order to answer this question satisfactorily, it is necessary, I think, to bear in mind the distinction, to which I have already referred, between the bearing of philosophy in general upon education and the more special bearing of psychology upon it. On the one hand, philosophy may be expected to throw some light on the general aims of human life, and so on the results that it is the business of education to realize. On the other hand, psychology may be expected to throw some light on the general nature of mental development, and so on the methods of education that are likely to prove most fruitful. In each case the assistance may be expected to be rather general than specific; but this fact ought not to make us regard it as of little value. It is my aim in what follows to bring out as definitely as possible the nature of the light which is thus thrown by philosophy in general and by psychology in particular.

Philosophy in general may be defined most simply as the discussion of what is ultimately real or true. Now this may be said, I think, to bear on education in two different ways. It bears on education as a criticism of the subject-matter that it seeks to impart, and again as a criticism of the type of life which it seeks to develop. Now on the former of these aspects it is not possible for us here to do more than touch incidentally. An educator would naturally wish to communicate what is true rather than what is false to the minds of his pupils; and if philosophy can help us to discriminate between these, it ought to be of some interest to the educator; but to consider this aspect of the subject at any length would lead us too far into the intricacies of philosophical principles. And, after all, this bearing of philosophy on education is somewhat indirect; for most educators have to take their subject-matter to a large extent at second-hand, and have not time to inquire how far it is true, in any ultimate sense of the word. Still, there is a lesson to be derived from this aspect of philosophy, to which I shall shortly allude. But, in the meantime, it is the more ethical aspect of general philosophy to which I wish to refer, —*i.e.*, philosophy as the discussion of what is real or true in

human aims and efforts. It is this aspect of philosophy that bears most directly on educational ends; and we may understand its bearing most readily if we consider the divergent ends that educators may have before their minds.

There are many respects in which the aims of educators may diverge; but the most striking divergence is that which is briefly expressed by the two terms "Culture" and "Utility." In themselves, no doubt there is no necessary opposition between these two terms, any more than there is between some other famous opposites,—such as Socialism and Individualism, or regard for ourselves and regard for others. But there is a constant tendency in practice to lay emphasis on such antitheses. The truly cultured man will hardly fail to be a useful member of society, and to be, in the highest sense of the word, successful; and the man who pursues what is really useful, either to himself or to others, can hardly fail to be truly cultured. But it is easy to understand the terms in a narrow sense, in which they stand in opposition to one another. Culture may be taken to mean devotion to certain intellectual aims, regarded as ends in themselves, apart from their bearing on human life; and Utility may be taken to imply that which is serviceable for a merely external and material form of success. The former is represented by the scholar in the old sense of the word, of whom we may take Browning's Grammarian as an attractive type,—one who "determined not to live, but know." The latter is represented by more modern tendencies, of which Mr. Herbert Spencer is a chief apostle. When these two types are presented to us in extreme forms, it is not difficult to see that neither of them is satisfactory. If the Grammarian were only "dead from the waist down," we might continue to admire him; but when we find that he is deadened also in heart and head, we inevitably scorn him as a pedant. The other type is perhaps nearer to our own hearts; and we must not lightly blaspheme against it. But at least we may say of it that it would not be so easy to make an inspiring poem about it as it was about the Grammarian. If the latter, in his search for a too remote good, is apt to miss his unit, the quick returns and little profit of the former are in the end still more despicable.

Now, philosophical reflection on the aims of human life may, I think, lead us to see why it is that neither of these educational ideals can be regarded as satisfactory, and may help to suggest a more complete ideal. For, when we speak of learning what is useful, philosophy will naturally inquire, Useful for what? Useful may mean merely useful for one's own advancement in life ; or, again, it may mean useful for the advancement of one's country, or for the general development of the human species. But whichever of these we may mean, we can hardly decide whether it is really useful until we understand wherein the true welfare of city or country or species consists ; and, from a philosophical point of view, it would scarcely be possible to recognize the true welfare of any of these as capable of existing without the culture of the highest powers of the individual. Hence utility, from a philosophical point of view, would probably be to a large extent identical with culture. But, again, if culture is put forward as the end of education, philosophy must again ask, Culture of what, and with a view to what? And if it is answered that knowledge is an end in itself, there would still be the question, What kind of knowledge? Not, at least, the knowledge how many sands there are on the sea-shore, or of the latest scandal or the newest magazine article. The knowledge that can be regarded as valuable for its own sake can only be the knowledge of that which is real and significant ; and if we inquire why such knowledge is valuable, we shall find that it is valuable not merely because it is knowledge, but because of its relations to the great ends of human life,—*i.e.*, because of its utility in the highest sense of the word. I should say, therefore, that the light which philosophical reflection throws upon educational ends, from this point of view, lies in its enabling us to see the futility of the antithesis between culture and utility, as these are commonly considered.

It may be said, however, that ordinary common sense, without much philosophical reflection, might suffice to convince us of the emptiness of such phrases. But there is a more subtle form in which the same antithesis is apt to present itself, and in which somewhat more reflection is required to solve the

difficulty that arises. It connects itself, namely, with the opposition between the good of the individual and the good of society. The ideal of culture may be taken as consisting, in the end, of the development of all the faculties of the individual; while the ideal of utility resolves itself into the aim at such a cultivation as tends to fit a man for his place in the social whole. Now it is easy to see that these two ideals may be to some extent opposed. The man who aims at an all-inclusive culture may easily become so good that he is good for nothing; and, on the other hand, the man who seeks to fit himself for some special function may easily render himself decidedly narrow in his range of attainments. Can philosophical reflection throw any light on this difficulty?

Now it is certainly in such a case as this that we must admit that it cannot be the task of philosophy to provide a complete way of escape from such a practical difficulty; but at the same time philosophy may fairly be expected to throw some light upon it. And, in the first place, I think it may be shown at least that the antithesis cannot be quite so complete as it is apt at first to appear. The cultivation of all our faculties is no doubt very different from the development of some particular aptitude; but is the cultivation of all our faculties a strictly possible ideal? What are our faculties, and what do we mean by the cultivation of them all? A man can hardly live at all without in some degree exercising every power that he possesses; and on the other hand it would probably be impossible for any one to develop every power to the highest possible extent; and if we mean merely that they should all be developed equally, then we may naturally ask why any one should aim at this? If a man is a good teacher, he may also reasonably enough aim at being a good singer, a good cyclist, and a good citizen; but is it reasonable that he should also desire to be a good preacher, a good dramatist, a good ventriloquist, and a good card-sharper? Probably, when people speak of a general cultivation of all their faculties, they mean only a harmonious development of some of their most important powers. Then we may ask again, Important for what? And I think we shall find in the end that there can be no

reasonable estimate of the most important human powers without reference to their serviceableness in society. Again, we may fairly ask whether any one can be in any high degree serviceable to society if he has not developed his powers in a more or less harmonious way. Perhaps there are some physical dexterities that can in this way be acquired, but in modern societies at least these tend to become less and less important. Even technical instructors begin to realize that general intelligence is more important than mechanical aptitudes. Hence, while we may admit that there is some difference between general culture and specialized attainments, the absolute antithesis between them appears to be hardly tenable.

Now the philosophical conception which seems to me specially valuable at this point is that of the vital relation of the individual to the social whole. It was Plato's grasp of this essential idea, more perhaps than anything else, that made his treatment of the educational ideal in his "Republic" so suggestive and inspiring. Soon after his time it began to be lost. Even in Aristotle we see the beginning of the decay of it; and with the Stoics we find the idea of the wise man, with a self-centred life of his own. In modern times it has been one of the main aims of ethical writers to reinstate the conception of the essential relation of the individual to the social whole,—a conception which is sometimes expressed by the inadequate and misleading metaphor of a social organism. It would be impossible for me here to make any attempt to develop what is involved in this conception;* but the more we realize what it means the more shall we see the futility of a culture which is not socially useful and of a social utility which does not involve culture. No doubt there may still be some practical difficulty in effecting a harmonious adjustment between the various elements required, just as there is also the practical difficulty on the part of each individual in finding the exact

* I may perhaps be allowed to take this opportunity of saying that I partly agree with some of the criticisms recently passed by Mr. McTaggart in this JOURNAL on my own use of the conception of Organism; but I hope to be able, at some future time, to restate the main points in a way less open to objection.

place in the social system into which he fits. But these are difficulties of detail, not oppositions in principle.

This point connects itself closely with another form of opposition between educational ideals,—that which may be expressed as the opposition between the extensive and the intensive cultivation of the mind. Should we seek to know a great number of different things, or rather to specialize in some one direction? This is a question that is often of great practical moment; and here again, though philosophical reflection cannot be expected to yield us a categorical answer, it does, I think, give us a good deal of help. It helps us this time from the more metaphysical side, by pointing out that real knowledge can never be the knowledge of one thing or of a number of things, but only of a systematic whole. The ideal of knowledge which seeks to advance itself by adding one thing to another is pursuing what Hegel calls the simply endless (*das schlecht-unendliche*). The man who knows this and that is not much farther on. What we want to see is rather that this and that belong to the same whole. If we can discover this, we transcend the simple finitude of things, and reach what Hegel calls the true infinite. This was brought out by Goethe as well as by Hegel, when he said that the only way to reach the infinite is to view the finite on every side,—

“Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten,
Geh nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten.”

The ideal which is thus suggested is that expressed in the saying, *Multum non multa*,—thoroughness rather than multiplicity. But this does not mean simple specialization. It means studying a thing so deeply as to apprehend its living relations to other things, and so involves the breaking down of the opposition between the many and the one.

Thus, I should say generally that the lesson that we may derive from philosophy with respect to the educational ideal is that it is to be found in a certain wholeness, which is the essence of truth and reality. It is an error to think that one can serve the world by losing one's soul; it is equally an

error to think that one can cultivate one's soul in a corner. It is an error to think that one grows wise by knowing a lot; it is equally an error to think that one can know any one thing without discovering its relation to others. Life and knowledge are living wholes, and must be so treated in education.

This leads us to notice the other aspect in which philosophy may be expected to throw light on education,—viz., the psychological aspect. Besides helping to provide us with a view of the end or ideal involved in education, philosophy may throw some light on the means or process by which the end is to be reached. This is perhaps the aspect that has in recent times attracted most attention; and it is possible that some have exaggerated the help that education is likely to derive in this way. But I think there are two points that are of considerable importance,—the points that are commonly expressed by the terms *Apperception* and *Suggestion*. The writers who have made most use of these conceptions are different from those who have most emphasized the organic unity and concreteness of life and knowledge; and, indeed, there is even a certain opposition between the types of philosophy that are connected with these various ideas. Yet, as it happens, there is a real relation and even unity of principle involved in the various points of view. Let us take first *Apperception*.

This is a long word, but what it means is comparatively simple. It means that our intellectual life is to be regarded as a whole, and that the significance of what enters into it cannot be properly understood without considering it in relation to the whole within which it is brought. "The eye sees only what it brings with it the power of seeing." What anything is for us depends not simply on what it is in itself, but on the way in which we grasp it. Now this point is of the utmost importance for education. It brings out the futility of heaping up the material of knowledge instead of providing ourselves with a point of view that can master it. We speak of the treasures of knowledge; but what we most want is not treasures, but the philosopher's stone that turns lead to gold.

What has to be provided, above all things, is not knowledge, but a way of looking at the world.

One thing that may be brought home to us in this way is the supreme importance of the great literatures of the world as instruments of education ; for in these is summed up the quintessence of wisdom. But in truth all subjects may be made instruments of such education, if skilfully handled. It is somewhat futile to contend as to the best kind of subject to begin with in education. There is still a large element of truth in the saying of Dr. Johnson,—more forcible, no doubt, than it is refined: “Sir,” he said, “it is no matter what you teach them first, any more than what leg you should put into your breeches first. Sir, you may stand disputing which is best to put in first, but in the meantime your breech is bare. Sir, while you are considering which of two things you should teach your child first, another boy has learned them both.” Anything will serve as suitable matter for education if only we can make it live,—if only we can place it in the atmosphere of reality. But there is no royal road to this. The only way in which it can be done for the pupil is, in the end, by its having been done for the teacher ; and the thorough education of the teacher must thus be the foundation of everything else. It is here, perhaps, that we see the true significance of a great saying of Plato. Plato said that his ideal republic would never be realized till philosophers became kings or till kings become philosophers. But his republic was essentially in the main an educational system ; and we might almost say that what he really meant was that no great good would be accomplished in human life till philosophers became schoolmasters or till schoolmasters became philosophers. And there is a truth in this, if we do not forget the counter-truth, to which I referred before, that a philosophical school is no more to be thought of than a philosophical furnace. The saying is true only when we understand the term philosopher in its large Greek sense, in the sense in which Rousseau and Goethe were philosophers as well as Plato and Herbart, in the sense in which any one is a philosopher who has a true apprehension of the reality of things, or who approaches things in

the spirit in which alone reality can be apprehended,—the spirit to which the antithesis is that of pedantry, which catches only the outer form or shell and misses the inner essence and life.

So far, then, I have endeavored to lay before you three closely related ideas,—that the life of society is a living whole, that knowledge is a living whole, that the mind is a living whole. Now I may add, further, that, if the mind is a living whole, it may be expected to grow. And this is another point that the teacher must always bear in mind. If the mind is to grow, it must be receiving material that it can assimilate, and, what is perhaps even more important, it must be looking forwards. There is sometimes a danger of forgetting what a child is, and so of presenting it with a kind of material that is wholly unsuitable to its stage of development; and there is sometimes also an opposite danger of thinking too much of what a child is, and losing sight of what it is about to be. The educator must sternly reject the old logical axiom that “what is, is.” He must learn that the essence of things lies not in what they are, but in what they have in them to be,—what Aristotle called the *τί ἦν εἶναι*,—and that this is most of all true of human life. All through his life man never is essentially what he is, but rather what he aims at being, what he takes as his ideal and guiding principle; and a child, even more than a man, lives almost entirely in the future, “partly is and wholly hopes to be,” and must be fed with “forward-looking thoughts.” Hence there may even be some danger in being too much interested in children, adapting oneself too closely to their present ways of thinking, and forgetting that a child is not simply a child, but far more truly is “father to the man.” For, as Aristotle taught us, what is last in the order of growth is first in the order of reality.

It is here that the idea of suggestion is more particularly in place. What we learn has value for us on the whole only if it is something that lives and carries us forward. It must be a force in our lives; it must, so to speak, hypnotize us and possess us, otherwise it can be no match for the forces that

tend to drag us away from it. There are suggestions everywhere around us, ideas that are forces. The sea is a constant suggestion to a boy that lives near it. It suggests travel and adventure, a wider world, a larger experience. Unless education can take hold of one as the sea might take hold of him, with a real force of suggestion, there is little hope that it can mean much for him. It is in this force of suggestion, more, perhaps, than in anything else, that a great educator differs from one who is not great. It was here, for instance, that Thomas Arnold had his power. He suggested manliness, high principle, force of character. These were with him living ideas that caught hold of his pupils, as a tendency to drink might have caught hold of them. They were drunk, not with wine, but with that spirit. They were inspired. And no education can be good for much that is not to some extent of this character. A pupil cannot come to much unless he is made to feel that it is as fine a thing to be a student as to be a pirate; that to learn is an adventure; that the swell of the ocean is under him, and that he is being carried on into strange lands.

The remarks that I have now made are perhaps somewhat desultory in their character, and not very enlightening. I have been trying simply to emphasize a single point, which I think is of importance for education,—viz., the necessity of seeing the society in which we exist, the knowledge for which we strive, the mind that we seek to cultivate, in their living relations, so as to view them as wholes, as concrete realities. To do this is, I believe, the only salvation of the teacher. Without this he sinks into a Gradgrind, one who communicates “facts,” who piles one thing on the top of another. His pupils grow up believers in the damnable heresy that “what is, is,” and are never able to realize that nothing is what it is, but always what it was and what it will be. Such a pupil is doomed to remain in the state of Peter Bell,—

“A primrose by the river’s brim,
A yellow primrose was to him,
And it was nothing more.”

How different is the attitude of one who is able to say, with Tennyson, in his often quoted but still quotable lines,—

“Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand.
Little flower ! Yet if I could understand
What you are, root and all and all in all,
I should know what God and man is !”

It is this thoroughness of insight that makes the meanest kind of knowledge great ; the insight that enables us to see that things are not what they seem, but what they mean ; that the reality of things lies not in what we see and perceive, but in what we think and feel and will and are.

There is just one other remark that I may add. We hear a great deal of discussion about religious education in schools. Now I cannot but believe that if teaching could be carried on more thoroughly in the spirit that I have tried to indicate, it would be felt more and more that in essence all education is religious. For what is religion but the constant recognition that life has to be lived in the spirit of the whole, that we are not fragments, that the world is not a collection of fragments, but that our lives and the life of the world form a real whole ? To know any one thing truly is to know this ; and the consciousness of this gives dignity to all knowledge as it does to all action.

“ A servant, with this clause,
Makes drudgery divine.”

It was thus that Plato thought of education, and so for him all education began and ended in religion. And I believe that, if we could but realize the truth of this, all controversy about the teaching of religion would be well-nigh at an end. All teaching would be religious. But this is, perhaps, to point to a distant ideal, to something that can only be reached when philosophers become teachers or when teachers become philosophers.

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